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The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers 
by Graham E. Fuller and John Arquilla 
ew forces at work in the post+zold war world are changing the strategic 
N environment in which American foreign policy operates. Chief among these is the emergence or return of states that are creating new 
configurations of regional power. ‘These states, by definition, possess the will, 
means, and ambition to conduct foreign policy in their own neighborhood 
without close regard to the preferences of the United States or multilateral 
organizations, including the United Nations. These are “new” powers in that 
they have recently acquired unprecedented opportunities for autonomous action, 
facilitated by current widespread confusion in the West over strategic values- 
what really matters and what does not. This confusion makes it unlikely that 
the United States, absent clear and present danger, would move decisively to 
prevent the emergence of new centers of strategic power. Maintenance of a 
global American primacy, although still advocated by some, thus no longer 
seems a realistic policy goal. As regional politics grow, “renationalization” of 
strategic policies by other major world states-not an issue during the cold 
war-cannot be held off for much longer, despite U.S. preferences to the 
contrary. 
As regional centers of power emerge, the United States faces important 
choices about the kinds of broad strategies to pursue in relation to them: 
acquiescence, encouragement, or resistance. But in order to choose wisely 
American policymakers must first understand how international politics are 
increasingly shaped, not by a single, globalized process, but rather by several 
regional ones. Next, they must appreciate how new elements of power- 
especially psychological and behavioral ones-liberated by the end of the cold 
war are invalidating traditional views of foreign relations. Lastly, they must 
assess the challenges posed by the combination of new “regionalized” politics 
and new kids of power. This article takes up these tasks in turn, applies its 
findings to the various emerging systems, and discusses their implications for 
U.S. foreign policy. 
Graham E. Fuller is a senior political scientist at RAND and former vice chahnan of the National Intelligence 
Council at the Central Intelligence Agency. John Aquih is a professor of intemational wlations at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. 
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Ambitious new regional powers have been emancipated by the end of 
a cold war that once imposed sharp discipline on their liberty to destabilize 
the delicate balance of a bipolar system. Such rising regional powers include-but 
are not limited to-China, Iran, Iraq, India, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
South Africa, Nigeria, Brazil, Turkey, and Serbia. All these have significant impact 
on the security and livelihood of their neighbors and thus demonstrate the 
extent to which power is devolving to new, more autonomous regional systems. 
To be sure, new global forces such as international economics and the information 
revolution appear to unify the world as never before and occasionally exert a 
powerful influence on regional struggles. But even in “economics-dominated” 
East Asia, trade and communication hardly suffice to explain Beijing’s calculus 
in lobbing missiles into Taiwanese waters. Technology and ~terdependence, 
in sum, are far more likely to become instruments in aid-fashioned power 
politics than agencies for transcendence of such conflict. 
At the same time, the perceived strategic interests of the United 
States-the only state capable of aspiring to global management-have nar- 
rowed sharply. The interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and even Iraq 
sparked major debates in Congress. As Americans increasingly ask Who cares? 
and display a weakening stomach for casualties, it appears that only direct 
threats such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism are liable to inspire bold U.S. 
action. Certainly, “softer” issues such as open trade, democratization, human 
rights, and ecology will not. As a result, recent discussions of U.S. foreign policy 
have had little to say about geopoiiti~al contexts, with the exception of Russia 
and China (lest the old, or a new, cold war break out), and an exaggerated 
concern for Iran. To note this is not to judge the wisdom of less-activist policies, 
only to observe that regional powers enjoy unprecedented opportunities for 
wielding international influence. 
Today, power is increasingly diffused and redistributed downward into 
regions-part of a much more complicated world. And where the world once 
was largely concerned with interstate conflict and competition among great 
extraregional powers, much of today’s international politics revolves around 
internal conflicts-including the breakup of states and separatism-with regional 
implications. Hence, insofar as interstate warfare continues, it is less likely to 
involve fighting among the greatest states and is more likely to feature either 
localized conflicts between regional states and great powers, or between regional 
powers and their own local rivals. 
where people once believed the gateway to the creation of new nation 
states had almost clanged shut, we now witness new waves of ethnic passion 
and a search for identity and elf-dete~ation not readily stemmed-both 
factors buttressed by growing international sympathy for democracy and human 
rights, Indeed, the present international order lacks even the energy to impose 
a moratorium on break-away nations and the formation of new states, many 
of which are born fighting. The international system has thus become far more 
unruly, partly because the concept of power is being redefmed in non~ditional 
ways. 
Regional Powers 
Revisiting Concepts of Power 
At least three different kinds of power matter today: traditional inherent 
physical power, the power of acquired material capabilities, and psychological, 
behavioral power, or what Napoleon and Hitler referred to as will. The first 
category is quite familiar. Physical power derives from the size, location, and 
resources of a state, which directly affect the geopolitics of its nei~~rh~. 
Among the states that readily come to mind in thii category of inherent, concrete 
power are the United States, Germany, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, and 
Brazil. 
The second form of power is characteristic of states that work to acquire 
material power and capabilities via shrewd economic policies and organization, 
the forging of military forces ~spro~~onate to their size, and acquisition of 
unconventional weapons. In a world awash with sophisticated, readily accessible 
military technology, it is relatively easy for small states to develop a specialized 
“niche” capability in warfare-suitable to local conditions and capable of 
deterring a stronger power from intervening in light of the drastically increased 
costs of conflict. States can also augment their inherent strength through systems 
of allies and clients (Western Europe being the most obvious example) or by 
highly disciplined internal mobilization. Israel, for instance, wields military might 
out of proportion to its size. Japan has created a powerful economic state, 
despite a paucity of resources. Iraq and North Korea have built powerful 
destabilizing military instruments. And even Singapore and Taiwan exercise 
influence vastly ~spropo~onate to their size. Yet even as economic power 
gains increasing importance, states Iike Japan, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia cannot 
truly defend themselves against detetied opponents-indeed, their unpro- 
tected economic power can perversely invite intimidation and attack. During 
the cold war, these states could rely upon U.S. security guarantees. Now, 
however, as American protection grows ~cons~nt, rising regional states are 
creating new economic and industrial forms of power-but including military 
dimensions that may substantially affect the politics of regional security. 
For instance, even poor regional states today can field large military 
forces since their manpower costs are tiny relative to those of more advanced 
states. That implies the possibility that economic growth in less-advanced regions 
may be translated into ~litic~~~~ power more rapidly than ever before. 
Lastly, the rise of economic blocs, which have formed in most regions, reinforces 
the fractionating trend in the world already apparent at the social and political 
levels. Thus, economic regionalism, in addition to fostering the growth of 
localized (“niche”) military power, may weaken further the old, unified world 
trading system. 
The third form of power lies in the psychological and ideological realms, 
which, in a world of regions, may matter more than traditional power concepts. 
Though impossible to quantify, this kind of power is ignored at one’s peril. 
Simply put, psychological power emerges from “national will” born of historical 
experience and perspective, national myths, sense of destiny, and perceived 
ethnic or religious mission. what are the historical ambitions or vision of a 
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given nation (e.g., its manifest destiny)? How powerful is the will of a people 
to achieve its ends, regardless of size (e.g., Vietnamese, Palestinians, Chechens, 
or Serbs)? What is the ideology of its state, and how does it crystallize and 
direct national impulses toward concrete political ends (e.g., in North Korea or 
Cuba)? Does the nation have a special reading of history that feeds its ambitions? 
Can the state harness ethnic homogeneity or command responsiveness from 
related external ethnic or religious diaspora communities-as with the Arab 
world, overseas Chinese, Slavic nations, or the Latin world? Nations possessed 
of this element of psychological power can often spark international con&t 
more easily than the first class of inherently powerful states precisely because 
of their unpredictability and hostility to the existing international 
States order. They appear, in short, “irrational,” especially in their 
possessing 
unwillingness to bow to the established order of international 
power born of 
power. 
The unanticipated and rapid ascendence of a state to 
national will international importance is an additional psychological factor, 
are the most often exerting a destabilizing impact upon an international order 
difficult to 
slow to accommodate new realities. China, Serbia, Iran, and Iraq 
today, and Vietnam and Cuba at an earlier date, shook the 
manage. international order with their sudden prominence and audacity. 
In part, then, new regional powers are self-selected, driven by 
old or new ambitions, augmented perhaps by a new ideology or charismatic 
leader, and able to exploit the newly permissive international environment. 
A further element of national psychology is the ambitious state’s character 
of governance. Does authoritarian rule facilitate the creation of a united, 
mobilizing ideology, or does it conversely stifle loyalty and creativity, fostering 
too much anger, internal resistance, and ultimate fragility? Does democracy 
serve to strengthen support for national ambitions, or does it dilute such support 
through endless debate? Does a given regime engage in erratic behavior that 
awakens uncertainty and concern in its neighbors? Can it intimidate others 
through ready use or threats of violence, terrorism, brutality, or irregular warfare? 
Is it willing to run risks and defy international norms? Even Israeli strategists 
have often spoken of the need to act, or appear to act, as a “crazy state,” for 
instance by retaliating disproportionately to Arab threats to its security. The 
image of a state and its behavior can thus sometimes persuade neighbors to 
seek accommodation, while at other times heightening their will to resist. 
Additional psychological and strategic advantage can be acquired by 
aggressive military tactics that use a regionally tailored “niche capability” to 
deter casual intervention, Even small states wielding many of these charac- 
teristics-sometimes called “rogues’‘-exercise influence considerably in excess 
of their size. Will the United States, or any other major power, be consistently 
willing to take on ambitious states that might disturb a regional order, but not 
the global order? Because of the more volatile, transient nature of this “behavioral” 
kind of power, it is the most difficult to manage effectively. The possibility that 
this type of power may characterize much of international conflict in the coming 
decades is a real and disturbing challenge. 
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Regional Powers 
Three Strategies for International Management 
Much debate now focuses on the changing interests and future role of 
the United States as Americans focus on domestic events and ask what foreign 
imbroglios are of sufficient magnitude to require the United States to expend 
blood and treasure to alleviate them. Given that the United States appears now 
to lack both the psychological will and the willingness to expend the resources 
needed to lead any sort of global order, what more reserved foreign-policy 
strategy affords it the best chance of defending itself and its interests? No one 
answer is possible in the new international arena; me response must vary, 
region by region. 
When theorists consider U.S. policy toward regional international systems, 
they usually identify two classic strategies. First, we can cultivate local hegemons 
to help manage regional relations-the use of the shah of Iran in the 1970s is 
probably the best example of this phenomenon. The alternative broad strategy, 
historically the most time-honored, is the preservation of a balance of power- 
checking a regionally threatening power by creating local counterweights. 
Examples of this approach include the strengthening of Iraq against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran during the 198Os, balancing Vietnam by shoring up Thailand 
after the fall of South Vietnam, and encouraging South Korea to develop 
industrially and militarily to hold back the North. 
But a third strategy toward regional relations-one generally alien to 
proponents of vigorous U.S. leadership-can be described as the “laissez-faire” 
approach. That consists of letting the politics of a region unfold and take its 
“natural course” without significant outside intervention. Alternative terms for 
this strategy might be “benign neglect” or even isolationism. It could also be 
described as an “ecological” approach, whereby extraregional powers refrain 
from interfering in the normal workings of the local order, partly out of the 
belief that to turn back a powerful and natural course of events implies heavy 
costs and risks. An illustrative analogy is the willingness of the U.S. Forest 
Service to allow large tracts of national forest in Yellowstone Park and elsewhere 
to bum, because periodic fires are part of the natural cycle of life in forests, 
clearing the way for new, healthier growth. Of course, people are not trees, 
and such an ecological approach to foreign affairs might seem coldly Darwinian. 
But as we have recently seen in the former Yugoslavia, sometimes “fires” must 
bum their course before pacification is possible. 
It is simply the case that powerful forces making for conflict among 
nations are sometimes extremely difficult or costly to arrest or repress. When 
an extraregional power expends major effort to attempt to slow or stop a 
nationalist separatist movement, for instance, or a push for independence, or 
strives to prop up a “doomed” autocratic regime, the ‘natural” course of human 
events is defied. At best, the power attempting to keep the lid on pays a heavy 
price in resources, lives, and frustration; at worst, it suffers humiliating defeat. 
How much longer, for example, could the shah of Iran have been propped 
up late in his rule? How long could the centrifugal forces of the ultimate collapse 
of communism in the Soviet Union have been withstood, even with massive 
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external support for the old regime? How long can the Palestinians be held in 
thrall by Israel, and at what cost, before they have their state anyway? 
The assumption behind the laissez-faire approach is that international 
politics has a certain natural dynamic. When left alone to develop “‘organically,” 
regions will tend to produce their own locally hegemonic states, or balances 
of power, or perhaps even chaos for a time. The Balkans present a case in 
point: absent foreign interventiun, would post-Yugoslavia Balkan politics have 
reached a kind of stasis? Is the international order wise in intervening against 
forces that might be inevitable, that is, extremeiy di&ult to resist over the 
longer run? Does resistance against this natural order provide only a false and 
temporary peace? The sense that certain kinds of forces in politics are irrepressible 
over the long run suggests that wise powers will choose to resist these ebbs 
and flows only fur a limited period and only when the stakes are exceptiunally 
high. Clearly, in the case of Hitler’s bid to conquer Europe or the Soviet bid to 
bring large portions of the world under communist rule, resistance at very high 
cost was justified. But how many cases are so clear-cut in history-and who 
will assume the cost? 
If regional conflicts are likely to dehne much of the history of the 
coming half century, the United States has no choice but to examine with care 
the attributes, merits, and drawbacks of the three alternate strategjes: support 
for regional hegemony, local balance of power, and the laissez-faire approach. 
Far from endorsing any of them per se, we believe that no single strategy is 
either permanently or universally sound fur all regions of the world. Different 
strategies might be required for different regiutls at any one time, Indeed, 
powers wishing to expend minimal resources for maximum effect-which 
certainly is the case with the United States today-may particularly need to 
emulate the judo fighter who gauges the power and direction of forces besetting 
him and maneuvers so as not to absorb them head-on. 
The idea of supporting a regional hegemon springs from the American 
disinclination to be the security guarantor of first resort around the world. The 
political and economic costs of constant intervention to meet crises are simply 
too high. In principle, a regional power, or powers, could be counted on to 
maintain focal stability with its own diplomacy, prestige, and military power if 
necessary. In times of regional turmoil, a need for peacekeeping and peacemaking 
forces might arise, a need that would ideally be fulftled by the hegemon-as 
has been the case in Liberia in recent years, where Nigeria has shouldered the 
financial and miktary burden of the lengthy peacemaking mission of the Economic 
Cumrnunity of West African States (ECOWASX Regional hegemons also have 
an incentive to control local arms flows and prevent the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, 
The United States might be tempted to pursue this option, particularly 
in regions where its interests are limited. To be sure, the United States cannot 
of its&f create a regional hegemon, but it can support such a player when it 
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perceives a mutuality of interests, For example, a tolerably democratic Russia 
might well emerge as the hegemon in large parts of the former Soviet Union, 
preventing disorder or conflict from spreading. India might play such a role in 
South Asia and parts of Southeast Asia. Selected African states such as a 
democratic Nigeria or South Africa could be the internationally anointed pillar 
of regional security. Brazil or Argentina could play such a role where required 
in South America. East Asia is far more complex, since the most obvious regional 
hegemon, China, is also the most likely source of threats. For the time being, 
therefore, East Asia is probably not a candidate for a policy based on regional 
hegemony, but rather for a balance-of-power approach. 
A strategy of encouraging or tolerating regional hegemony, however, 
has several disadvantages. First, some trends in U.S. strategic thinking are 
antithetical to any kind of regional hegemony if it would limit the role of the 
United States as primary arbiter of most major conflicts. Secondly, such a system 
requires confidence that the hegemon shares a number of common values and 
assumptions about the world and thus would not turn on the West in pursuit 
of its own interests. A third problem in supporting a regional hegemon is that 
smaller local states might understandably resist the hegemony-even by at- 
tempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction or by looking to extraregional 
powers for protection. Pakistan’s resentment of India’s hegemonic drive, for 
instance, has caused it to develop nuclear weapons and to consort with China 
and the United States, contributing to regional tensions. Nor can a hegemon 
guarantee stability if great powers pursue overlapping ambitions in potentially 
common spheres of influence. For example, India and China will jockey for 
influence in Southeast Asia and Inner Asia (Tibet, Central Asia), as will Russia 
in the latter region. 
Lastly, a strategy that depends upon a regional hegemon can be risky 
when U.S. interests are great, since conflicts with the hegemon take on more 
importance. Indeed, most hegemons, by their very nature, are likely to grow 
resentful of the need to share power with the United States when they can 
dominate the region on their own. There may be, in other words, no such 
thing as a tame hegemon. 
A strategy of support for regional hegemons thus offers a few oppor- 
tunities, but also numerous problems. Yet if the United States is reticent to 
pursue a strategy of regional hegemons, then it will need to devise means to 
oppose their rise and turn instead to an alternative policy: traditional balance- 
of-power diplomacy. 
Balance-of-Power Strategy 
A balance-of-power strategy offers three basic benefits. First, it leverages 
U.S. power in that a modest investment of resources may build viable coun- 
terweights to would-be regional hegemons. Secondly, a balancing strategy will 
enjoy the support of most smaller states, who naturally fear the rise of a 
preponderant power in their region. A great world power, alter all, only visits 
an area briefly and periodically in support of its immediate interests, but a local 
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regional power is capable of intense and continuous meddling. A third benefit 
of balancing is that the smaller states feel more secure and therefore are far 
less tempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
But the balancing strategy also poses problems. First, the demands and 
costs of maintaining a regional balance may be unclear and unpredictable, 
especially if an aspiring regional hegemon resists efforts to frustrate its dominance. 
India, for example, has always deeply resented U.S. efforts to make Pakistan 
a lOd counterweight and has greatly expanded and modernized its land, sea, 
and air forces, and even developed nuclear weapons, in its efforts to thwart 
any balancing strategy aimed against its position in South Asia. The case of 
India, with its historic hm towards Moscow, also highlights the risk that a 
thwarted hegemon will seek assistance from extraregional powers to offset, and 
potentially overcome, an outside balancer. 
Further complicating the cost issue is the possibility that the lesser local 
states will exploit their own strategic importance to intensify their demands 
upon the United States for material support or protection. Examples of this 
behavior abound: the small Persian Gulf states versus Iran or Iraq; Kyrgyzstan 
and Taj~is~n versus Uzbekistan; and Taiwan versus China. What is more, 
threatened small states may require direct U.S. combat assistance in order to 
preserve the balance of power. Under the worst circumstances, that can lead 
to debacles such as the Vietnam War, but even successful interventions to 
restore a local balance do not come cheaply, a point demonstrated by the 
Korean War and the $100 billion Persian Gulf War (of which the United States 
paid somewhat less than half). 
A final problem with a balance-of-power strategy is its inherent com- 
plexity. Successful balancing of an aspiring local hegemon requires the marshaling 
of a number of states, each with its own perception of risks and rewards. In 
the Persian Gulf, for example, Iraq is clearly necessary to any mix of states that 
would ward off Iranian hegemony, and vice versa. Yet Iraq’s pariah status, and 
the reluctance of Gulf states to be guarded by either of these proven “wolves,” 
makes the formation of a viable indigenous balance problematic. The Iraqi 
example also illuminates the difficulty in measuring power with sufficient 
precision so as to form a robust balance. After the fall of the shah, Iranian 
regionaf hegemony was feared rather than fostered. That led to a U.S. “tilt” 
towards Iraq during the 1980s in the hope that it would act as a counterweight 
in its long war with Iran, This balancing strategy backf?red, however, when 
Iraq finally won a decisive victory in 1988, and no regional state, or combination, 
had the wherewithal to deter an Iraqi drive for hegemony. The cost of this 
imprecise exercise in balancing was the invasion of Kuwait and a massive 
American military inte~~ntion. 
Laissez-faire or “Ecological” Strategy 
This strategy recognizes that the powerful forces driving domestic, 
national, and regional politics can sometimes be withstood only ar considerable 
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cost or not at all It posits that great political, economic, and social changes are 
in fact long overdue in much of the world, however destabilizing or undesirable 
we may judge them to be. Old elites crumble; new classes, ethnic groups, and 
state challengers emerge; and pent-up frustrations over harsh social and economic 
conditions or prolonged periods of repression bubble up into radical movements, 
In principle, US. foreign-policy makers may applaud such movement towards 
reformed political and social orders and hope to channel it in the direction of 
democratic “enlargement.” But these same policymakers also harbor anxieties 
about the disruption and conflicts that accompany radical social upheaval. Thus, 
even as the United States promotes mndamental change in, for instance, China, 
it also supports the conservative regimes in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and 
Bahrain in their efforts to suppress Islamic political movements. 
A laissez-faire approach to coping with regional nationalism, revivalism, 
and other social activist movements accepts the notion that the costs of outright 
opposition to change would be prohibitively high, with ultimate success in 
doubt. This “less-is-more” strategy could thus prove a low-cost option that 
would not buck the “flow of history” and would allow regions to develop their 
own security systems. It is quite possible that a regional political order allowed 
to evolve on its own will produce a “natural” and enduring outcome. 
The costs and risks associated with such an “ecological” approach, 
however, are obvious. The very idea that a region should be allowed to develop 
on its own implies that it must be kept in a political biosphere free from outside 
intervention. Therefore, before adopting a hands-off strategy in any regional 
situation, the United States would also have to persuade other extraregional 
powers to refrain from intervening or taking advantage of the natural workings 
of the indigenous states. Given the current U.S. military preeminence and global 
reach, such persuasion might be possible at modest cost-but not without 
concomitant risk. First, in the near term, an ecological or laissez-faire approach 
might lead to chaos, with failing states involved in perpetual warfare and 
humanitarian tragedies a common occurrence. It would take an extraordinarily 
strong stomach to view such tragedies with equanimity. The second, longer-run 
risk is that, left alone, regional politics might throw up hegemons resentful of 
American influence and inimical to American interests. And since they will have 
arisen without US. sponsorship, there might be little chance of taming them. 
These risks suggest that a necessary condition for adopting an ecological 
approach in a region might be that its component states show every sign of 
being able to develop a healthy, local balance of power when left to themselves. 
Regions and Regional Powers 
Now that the strategic options are evident, let us examine the regions 
themselves as defined by a political geography that synthesizes space, power, 
and apparent psychology. Readers may question the inclusion of one country 
in a particular region or the exclusion of another, no doubt with good reason. 
We welcome such challenges; our key point is to encourage thinking that is 
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regional rather than global and that seeks to identify whether the geopolitical 
encounter at issue seems to be tending toward some kind of balance or regional 
hegemony. For analytic purposes, we have left out the Americas and Western 
Europe because they continue to live in the considerable shadow of American 
power. We also omit discussion of sub-Saharan Africa because its multitude of 
states and numerous sub- or micro-regions are too complicated to treat in a 
single short essay. (Given Africa’s potential for chaos amid failing states, and 
hopeful models of regional cooperation [for example, ECOWAS and the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference], it does, however, merit close 
study.) Lastly, in our discussion of the ten regions that remain we purposely 
refrain from including considerations of U.S. power so as to get at the regional 
dynamics as they would unfold in the absence of outside perturbations. 
~o~~e~~~~~. This region is currently bipolar in character, marked by 
the dynamic of a rising China seeking a hegemonic role in the region but 
contested by an enfeebled, ex-hegemanial, status quo Russia. Chinese aspirations 
are also offset by four strong secondary states: Japan, the Koreas, and Taiwan, 
each of which differs sharply in the character of the economic, political, military, 
diplomatic, or geographical power it enjoys. These states provide important 
balancing elements vis-2-vis China, but the struggle between the two Koreas 
also introduces an alternative source of conflict that affects the currently quiescent 
Sino-Russian dynamic. 
Southeast Asia. This region is currently marked by a potentially 
hegemonic power (China) resisted by three robust secondary states (Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam) and three extraregional actors (India, Japan, and 
Australia). The main potential for conflict resides in an ongoing Sino-Indian 
rivalry, although secondary-state competition is vigorous and sometimes fractious. 
South Asia. This region is clearly unipolar at present (India), with only 
one secondary local power capable of effective resistance: Pakistan. China is a 
first-tier extraregional actor that actively challenges Indian hegemony by shoring 
up Ptikistani capabilities. India’s political values are viewed as roughly congruent 
with the West’s. Indeed, a key dynamic is Western uncertainty about the need 
to maintain Pakistan as an offsetting force to India now that the cold war is 
over and India is a balancing force against China. South Asian regional politics 
are thus directly affected by Northeast and Southeast Asian politics. Indeed, 
Eastern Eurasia, broadly speaking, encompasses a triangular great-power contest 
among Russia, China, and India, whose hegemonic aspirations overlap in certain 
regions. 
Inner Asia. This region is currently bipolar: Russia attempts to maintain 
residual dominance in Central Asia and Mongolia, while China tries to maintain 
its threatened dominance in Tibet and Xinjiang. Both these hegemonic ambitions 
are under severe challenge by regional peoples aspiring to full national 
sovereignty. China and Russia may well contest each other for influence among 
all these emerging states. The dynamic is highly unstable, not only because of 
the shifting fortunes of the would-be hegemons, but also because of the internal 
rivalries of the emerging states themselves (for instance, the rivalry between 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the latter demons~a~g a significant “psychological” 
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power). Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India are all first-tier extraregional actors 
likely to be sought as counterweights to the aspiring hegemons. 
;rhe Transcaucasus and Capian Basin. This region displays a dynamic 
tension between a former unipolar system dominated by Russia and a future 
multipolar order in which emerging new states seek maximum sovereignty and 
are assisted by Turkey and Iran as first-tier actors and challengers to Russia. 
There is no significant external great power in the equation (except the United 
States, to a limited degree). Russia is still dominant in terms of traditional power 
measurements, while Iran compensates in the behavioral dimension and Turkey 
in its ability to exploit ethnic and economic ties. Turko-Iranian rivalries complicate 
the formation of a simple balance of regional states against Russia. Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan fill out a list of second-tier 
states. With the dynamic so fluid, the possibilities of conflict are considerable. 
7he Black Sea. Tension again exists here as a declining unipolar system 
under Russia gives way to a multipolar one including Turkey and Ukraine, but 
in which Russia remains “frst among equals.” Bulgaria and Romania are weak 
second-tier actors. Control of the Black Sea has been a geostrategic goal of 
each of the fust-tier actors for centuries and will continue to be a source of 
friction. Trade, particularly energy exports, could also sharpen regional com- 
petition. 
7be Persian G&f In essence, this is a bipolar system resting on Iran 
and Iraq, with the two primary powers currently roughly equivalent in strength. 
Saudi Arabia is the only viable second-tier power. The major tension of the 
region emerges from a severe skewing of its “natural” geopolitics owing to an 
extraordinary U.S. involvement that virtually cancels out ordinary regional 
dynamics. As that involvement wanes, a shift back to “natural” bipolarity could 
readily produce conflict. Potential extraregional first-tier powers could include 
Turkey, Israel, Russia, and Western Europe. Serious proliferation problems also 
exist. 
7be Leuant. This region is clearly multipolar (Egypt, Israel, and Syria), 
with Israel the leading first-tier state. Jordan and Saudi Arabia are secondary 
states, and Turkey, Iraq, and Iran the major extraregional powers with greater 
potential future involvement. Potential for conflict still exists over territorial 
disputes between Syria and Israel, and there may be some incentive for Syria 
to develop weapons of mass destruction to offset Israel’s capabilities. Sharp 
bipolarization of the region could emerge under harsh Likud regional policies. 
East-Central Europe. Tensions in this region emerge from the shifting 
dynamic away from Russian hegemony to a multipolar system including West 
European players, especially Germany. Secondary actors include Ukraine and 
all the former East European satellites, with additional new influence from 
Turkey, Greece, Croatia, and Serbia-the latter demonstrating mighty “behav- 
ioral” power. The emergence of an independent Ukraine blurs the known 
geopolitical dynamics of former preSoviet East Europe. Conflict potential is 
augmented by strong drives to new national sovereignty on the part of most 
states, and the forces of irredentism and ethno-nationalism, 
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7?3e Ma@+eb, This region is essentially multipolar among the three 
contending states of Algeria, Morocco, and Libya-the latter exhibiting mainly 
“behavioral” power. Egypt is a first-tier extraregional actor whose principal 
function has been to counter Libyan activism. West European states and the 
United States are more distant potential players. Conflict may arise among the 
major regional powers, but true hegemony is out of reach for any of them. 
Conclusion 
These geopolitical sketches are suggestive only, and each region merits 
serious study as the power relationships evolve. Nonetheless, some broad, 
tentative conclusions may still be drawn. Clearly, the regions with shiing 
dynamics (Northeast Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Caspian, and the 
Gulf) have the highest potential for conflict. Prospects for attainment of hegemony 
for any power in these regions are bleak, with the possible exception of South 
Asia. Russian hegemony in East-Central Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia 
is fading, but Russia will rel~quish that role only g~d~n~y. China will face 
the resistance of Russia and three tough second-tier states if it tries to expand 
its imperial sway westward. Thus, all of these regions display at least a modicum 
of balance, born of their own dynamics, suggesting the possible wisdom of a 
U.S. laissez-faire strategy toward them. Indeed, the United States may find itself 
in the enviable position of being able to promote more security with less 
involvement. 
That may well be the case in the Persian Gulf, where “dual containment” 
creates an unendingly tense situation, tacitly encouraging an Iran-Iraq entente. 
Thus, easing extreme pressures on Iran and Iraq (after Saddam Hussein) to 
allow them to balance each other may prove the wisest policy. Proliferation 
should nevertheless be steadfastly resisted, since it threatens an “instant” shift 
in balance-of-power arrangements. Simiiariy, thought needs to be given to the 
delicate calculus of power in East-Central Europe. NATO expansion plans, if 
played too aggressively, could imperil rather than shore up regional security if 
they spark polarization or become the catalyst for the resurgence of Russian 
anti-Westei~ postures. 
In the end, of course, policymakers would not wish to make US. foreign 
policy a hostage to theoretical abstractions, When crises arise, each case will 
be judged on its merits, However, Washington will need in each case to examine 
the characteristics of the regional order, the cost of affecting it, the effectiveness 
of alternative policies, and the feasibiiity of accomplis~~g desired change. In 
this context, the framework within which many of these crises may arise is of 
crucial importance. We have outlined a method for analyzing regional security 
patterns, one that we believe can provide useful insights for decision makers 
immersed in the countless details of each burgeoning crisis. In quieter moments, 
the approach we have developed should provide a blueprint for general 
foreign-policy strategy that prevents “drift” in the ab,sence of immediate threats, 
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Regional Powers 
The great benefit of taking a regional approach to foreign policy is that 
it economizes U.S. resources in a period of retrenchment and fosters flexibility 
in an era in which nimbleness is the prerequisite for success. While our approach 
has been strongly geopolitical in character, it also highlights the importance of 
the political character of the powers in question: is a would-be local hegemon 
(India, China, or Russia?) likely to participate in a global order based on shared 
values, or is it “revisionist” in its ambitions? In every case, and especially where 
the stakes are not high, subtlety is a prerequisite for successful diplomacy. The 
United States must thus be able to court Russian help in East Asia, even as it 
seeks to curtail Russian influence in East-Central Europe. There are precedents 
for such a discerning strategy: in the nineteenth century, Britain worked with 
Russia to keep the peace in the Concert of Europe at the same time that it 
waged a bitter cold war against Russia in the “Great Game” in Central Asia. 
Today, and in the years to come, the United States must learn the regional 
game as it is played all over the globe. For the alternatives to mastering 
that game are to maintain expensive global U.S. commitments on a 
long-term basis, or just place our heads in the sand. 
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